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R 281241Z SEP 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1873
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 04031

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: HABYARIMANA ON POLITICS AND ARUSHA

REF: KIGALI 4006

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

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2. PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA CONTINUES TO HAVE
CONFIDENCE IN PRIME MINISTER NSENGIYAREMYE IN SPITE
OF A CRITICAL LETTER THE PRIME MINISTER SENT HIM. HE
HOPES HE CAN WORK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TO PREPARE
FOR ARUSHA III.B, BUT SEEMS TO HAVE NO FRESH IDEAS,
EXCEPT TO SUPPORT ELECTIONS FOR A TRANSITION
PARLIAMENT. I AGREED TO URGE OPPOSITION PARTIES
TOWARD ELECTIONS, AND THE PRESIDENT AGREED TO
INTENSIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION,
ALTHOUGH HE CLEARLY DISLIKES THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
MDR AND PL. THE PRESIDENT URGED US AND OTHER

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OBSERVERS TO HELP MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE, BUT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE DISPLACED PERSONS CAN RETURN TO THE NEUTRAL CORRIDOR, AT LEAST UNLESS THE GOMN IS STRENGTHENED. END SUMMARY.

3. I SPENT OVER AN HOUR WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA SATURDAY MORNING SEPTEMBER 26. MY OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET A SENSE OF WHERE HE AND HIS PARTY ARE WILLING TO GO IN THE ARUSHA TALKS. I WAS ONLY PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL, AND MAY SEEK ANOTHER MEETING THIS WEEK TO FOLLOW UP ON THE CONVERSATION. THE LACK OF FOCUS IN SATURDAY'S CONVERSATION REFLECTS THE POLITICAL TURMOIL IN KIGALI SINCE ABOUT SEPTEMBER 15 WHEN THE ARUSHA TALKS BEGAN TO CONFRONT FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES.

BACKGROUND

4. REFTEL REPORTED CRITICISM OF THE PRIME MINISTER BY BOTH THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE PRESIDENCY. PERHAPS INEVITABLY, THE PRIME MINISTER STRUCK BACK
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WITH A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT BLAMING THE LATTER FOR ALL OF THE PROBLEMS THAT RWANDA HAS BEEN EXPERIENCING. ALTHOUGH THE LETTER WAS STAMPED CONFIDENTIAL, IT WAS SENT TO THE HEADS OF ALL PARTIES AND ALL MINISTERS AS WELL AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE CND, AND THEREFORE WAS QUICKLY CIRCULATED ALL OVER TOWN.

5. THE PRESIDENT WAS ANGRY, AND SEVERAL OF HIS AIDES SUGGESTED THAT HE USE THIS INSULT TO DISSOLVE THE CURRENT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.

6. IT'S A STRANGE LETTER, FIRST NOTING IN TWO AND ONE HALF PAGES THE PROGRESS MADE BY THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT ON THE PROGRAM IT HAD AGREED TO, AND CONCLUDING THAT A GOOD PART OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION WOULD VIEW THIS LIST OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS LARGELY POSITIVE. THEN THE PRIME MINISTER GOES ON TO BLAME THE PRESIDENT FOR A LONG LIST OF FAILURES, INCLUDING THE SILLY STRIKE OF MINISTERS IN AUGUST, THE FAILURE TO APPOINT A DIRECTOR FOR THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION, THE REFUSAL OF MRND MINISTERS TO EXAMINE A REPORT CRITICIZING MRND BOURGEMESTRES, THE FAILURE OF MINISTERS TO

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ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF RWANDAN OFFICERS UNJUSTLY
REMOVED FROM THE ARMY, THE MISBEHAVIOR OF MRND YOUTH,
THE FAILURE OF THE PRESIDENT TO SIGN COMMISSIONS FOR
THE NEW CIVIL SERVANTS AND RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTERS, A LITTLE POLITICKING ABOUT WHO IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISPLACED PERSONS, CRITICISM OF
THE PRESIDENT'S SON-IN-LAW, AND A GENERALIZED
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CRITICISM OF THE CND.

7. THESE ARE SERIOUS ISSUES PREVENTING THE SMOOTH
FUNCTION OF THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT, BUT NONE OF
THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT REALLY GETS TO
THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM. IT IS RATHER A BUCKSHOT
APPROACH TO BLAME SOMEBODY ELSE FOR THE PROBLEMS THAT
EXIST FOR WHICH BOTH SIDES BEAR SOME RESPONSIBILITY.

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INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

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AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

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AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 KIGALI 04031

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8. FINALLY PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA MADE A LONG SPEECH ON REFERENDUM DAY SEPTEMBER 25 CELEBRATING THE END OF THE MONARCHY BY REFERENDUM IN 1961. IN THE COURSE OF HIS SPEECH HE MADE SOME SHARP ATTACKS ON THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND CONTINUED TO TREAT THE RPF AS THE ENEMY RATHER THAN A PARTNER IN THE PRESENT PROCESS. BUT TOWARD THE END OF HIS SPEECH HE OFFERED

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THE HOPE THAT SOON THE RPF WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE ITS BATTLE WITH IDEAS RATHER THAN ARMS.

ARUSHA III.B

9. IT WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS GENERAL POLITICAL MALAISE THAT I TOLD THE DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET THAT I WOULD LIKE A CHANCE TO CHAT WITH HABYARIMANA. TO OPEN THE CONVERSATION, I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT WE WERE QUITE PLEASED WITH THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ARUSHA NEGOTIATIONS AND WONDERED WHAT HIS THOUGHTS WERE ON HOW THE OBSERVERS COULD BE HELPFUL IN MOVING THE TALKS FORWARD ANOTHER STEP.

10. THE PRESIDENT SAID THE FIRST THING THAT HE WOULD LIKE FROM THE OBSERVERS IS ASSISTANCE IN MAINTAINING THE CEASEFIRE. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN SOME FIRINGS AND SOME SMALL VIOLATIONS IN THE LAST THREE DAYS, INCLUDING ONE MORTAR SHELL THAT WENT OFF ABOUT FORTY METERS FROM A GOMN VEHICLE. (NOTE: NO GOMN INJURIES, BUT A RWANDAN ESCORT LOST A LEG.) I ASKED IF THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT THERE WAS ANY THREAT TO THE CEASEFIRE BY THE OCTOBER 10 DEADLINE WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE END OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESIDENT ASSURED ME THAT SO FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED OCTOBER 10 WAS SIMPLY A TARGET DATE AND THAT THE

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CEASEFIRE WAS INTENDED TO CONTINUE UNTIL THE
NEGOTIATIONS WERE COMPLETED. RWANDA WOULD SO OBSERVE
IT UNLESS ATTACKED. THE PRESIDENT THEN REITERATED
FAMILIAR POSITIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT
YIELD SO MUCH TO THE RPF THAT IT WOULD LOOK TO THE
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PEOPLE LIKE A RETURN TO 1959. THAT, HE SAID, WOULD
CREATE A CIVIL WAR IN PLACE OF THE GUERRILLA WAR IN
THE NORTH. HE WAS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE ON THIS
ISSUE BECAUSE THE PREVIOUS DAY WAS REFERENDUM DAY
WHICH REMINDED RWANDAN HUTUS THAT THEY WILL NEVER
RETURN TO THE FEUDAL MONARCHY SYSTEM THAT EXISTED
BEFORE 1959.

11. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS
IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO SOLVE ONE OR TWO PROBLEMS ON
THE AGENDA AT ARUSHA III.B EVEN IF IT WERE NOT
POSSIBLE TO COME TO A COMPLETE AGREEMENT. I URGED
HIM THEREFORE TO PICK UP THE THEME OF HIS ADDRESS
FRIDAY WHICH WAS UNITY AMONG RWANDANS AND BRING
TOGETHER THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN AN EFFORT TO FIND
COMMON GROUND BEFORE THE DELEGATION LEFT FOR ARUSHA
AGAIN. AT THE END OF OUR MEETING THE PRESIDENT SAID
HE WOULD DO SO.

12. I ALSO TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT I THOUGHT RWANDA
HAD MADE POINTS WITH THE OBSERVERS BY THE
PROPOSITIONS HIS NEGOTIATORS HAD PUT FORWARD AND THAT
IN ORDER TO KEEP THE OBSERVERS MOVING WITH HIM, IT
WAS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE A COUPLE OF STEPS IN ADVANCE AT
THE NEXT ROUND EVEN IF NOT A FULL PEACE ACCORD.

INTERNAL POLITICS - ELECTIONS

13. THE PRESIDENT CONTINUES TO SUPPORT EARLY
ELECTIONS AS A WAY OUT OF THE POLITICAL IMPASSE, AND
ASKED ME TO HELP CONVINCE THE MDR/PL/PSD GROUP TO
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ACCEPT ELECTIONS. HE WAS SPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS,
BUT ALSO SPECIFICALLY SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF A

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SPECIAL ELECTION FOR AN INTERIM PARLIAMENT WHICH
WOULD ADDRESS THE OPPOSITION'S CLAIM THAT THE CND IS
SIMPLY AN MRND ORGAN.

14. THE PRESIDENT IS CONVINCED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE
TO CREATE AN INDEPENDENT "ELECTIONS RWANDA" SYSTEM
WHICH WOULD NOT DEPEND ON LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR
ADMINISTRATION.

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R 281241Z SEP 92
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15. HE SAID THE RPF WANTS TO GET RID OF HABYARIMANA,

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AND THAT'S FAIR ENOUGH, BUT THEY WILL NOT GET RID OF HIM BY A MEANS OTHER THAN ELECTIONS, IMPLYING HE PLANS TO RUN AGAIN WHENEVER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE HELD.

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16. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SUGGESTED THE VALUE OF ELECTIONS FOR SOME OF THE COMMUNES WHICH ARE NOW WITHOUT BOURGEMESTRES BECAUSE LOCAL RESIDENTS HAVE THROWN THEM OUT. WHERE THIS HAS HAPPENED, THE MILITANTS INSIST THAT THE NEW BOURGEMESTRE BE A MEMBER OF THEIR PARTY, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO APPOINT A BOURGEMESTRE OF AN OPPOSITION PARTY WITHOUT HAVING SOME ELECTORAL BASIS ON WHICH TO MAKE THE SELECTION. THUS THERE ARE 15 OR 20 COMMUNES (OF A TOTAL OF 160) WHICH NOW HAVE NO LEADERSHIP.

17. I ASKED THE PRESIDENT IF HE COULD GET AN ELECTIONS BILL THROUGH THE CND IN A HURRY. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO EXPEDITE THE PROCESS IN THE CND AND HE WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO INSIST THAT THE CND MAKE A MINIMUM NUMBER OF CHANGES IN THE LEGISLATION BECAUSE THEY, AFTER ALL, DO NOT REPRESENT THE SAME NUMBER OF PARTIES THAT ARE REPRESENTED IN THE CABINET. HE SAID HE WILL INSIST THAT THE CND ACT ON WHAT EMERGES FROM THE CABINET QUICKLY AND WITH MINIMAL CHANGES. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID HE CANNOT INFLUENCE IN ANY WAY THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT WHICH HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND AT ALL.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

18. IN A PREEMPTIVE STATEMENT, THE PRESIDENT CRITICIZED THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR THE FAILURE TO COMPLETE THE INVESTIGATIONS OF BUGASERA, OF THE MINES IN VARIOUS

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PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, AND OF THE UNREST IN KIBUYE MOST RECENTLY. HE SAID HE HAS NOT SEEN THE REPORTS

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OF THE INVESTIGATIONS OF ANY OF THESE AND CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE COMBINATION OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE PARQUET AND THE GENDARMERIE CANNOT PRODUCE A REPORT THAT HE CAN READ. IN AN ANGRY ASIDE, HE SAID IN RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER HE WILL NOT REMOVE HIS SON-IN-LAW, A QUALIFIED CIVIL SERVANT, FROM HIS POSITION JUST BECAUSE HE HAPPENS TO BE HIS SON-IN-LAW. ON THE OTHER HAND HE NOTED THAT SEVERAL OF THE CRITICISMS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER HAD ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED, INCLUDING THE SIGNING OF COMMISSIONS FOR VARIOUS CIVIL SERVANTS.

19. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE PRIME MINISTER AND BELIEVES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER CAN DO A REASONABLE JOB FOR ALL OF RWANDA, EVEN THOUGH HE IS OVERLY INFLUENCED BY RADICALS LIKE FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU AND JUSTIN MUGENZI. HE WAS UPSET THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SENT THE LETTER, BELIEVING THAT THESE WERE THE TYPES OF ISSUES THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM FACE TO FACE IN THEIR BI-WEEKLY MEETINGS. I AGREED BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE LETTER DID NOT LOOK LIKE IT HAD BEEN DRAFTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF, AND I ENCOURAGED THE PRESIDENT TO WORK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AS THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNERSHIP NOW AVAILABLE TO THEM. THE PRESIDENT SAID IN SPITE OF ALL HE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER EVEN THOUGH HE DOESN'T UNDERSTAND WHY THE PRIME

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MINISTER DOES DUMB THINGS LIKE RUNNING OFF TO EUROPE
LAST WEEK AND NORTH AMERICA THIS WEEK WHEN HIS
PRESENCE IS NEEDED.

GOMN AND THE DISPLACED

20. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT THE GOMN SEEMED TO BE
QUITE UPBEAT AND OPTIMISTIC AFTER THEIR MEETING WITH
KANYARWENGWE IN BUYMBA ON SEPTEMBER 23. THE
PRESIDENT NOTED THAT GENERAL OPALEYE AND ASSISTANT

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SECRETARY GENERAL MAPURANGA WERE SUPPOSED TO MEET
WITH KAGAME, AND HE, THE PRESIDENT, WOULD HAVE FELT
FAR MORE REASSURED IF THE MEETING WITH KAGAME HAD NOT
BEEN REPLACED BY A MEETING WITH KANYARWENGWE.

21. THE PRESIDENT ASKED IF WE COULD DO ANYTHING MORE
TO HELP WITH THE MISERABLE LIVING CONDITIONS AND
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HUNGER OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS. (HE WAS ALSO VERY
GRACIOUS IN THANKING US FOR WHAT WE HAVE DONE TO

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DATE.) I TOLD HIM WE WOULD MEET AGAIN WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SEE WHAT URGENT NEEDS MUST BE TAKEN CARE OF, BUT BELIEVED THAT THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM AND THE ICRC WERE PRIMARILY OCCUPIED WITH CARING FOR THE FOOD SUPPLIES.

22. I THEN ASKED THE PRESIDENT IF THE NEUTRAL CORRIDOR WHICH THE OAU GOMN WAS TRYING TO IDENTIFY WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE DISPLACED TO RETURN TO FARM. THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW WAS THAT NEITHER SIDE WISHED TO SEE DISPLACED PUT IN THE NO-MAN'S-LAND, EVEN IF IT WERE BETTER FOR THEIR LIVELIHOOD, BECAUSE BOTH WOULD SUSPECT INFILTRATION AND COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER SIDE.

23. HABYARIMANA SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF AN ENLARGED GOMN WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO OBSERVE MORE, AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, PERHAPS THE DISPLACED MIGHT RETURN INTO PARTS OF THE NEUTRAL CORRIDOR.

COMMENT

24. THE PRESIDENT AGREED TO MEET WITH POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, AND I AGREED TO TRY TO HELP PUSH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. BUT THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES ARE A LONG WAY FROM REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE KINDS OF GUARANTEES THAT WILL MAKE THE RPF FEEL THAT THEY CAN JOIN IN THIS DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT. ABOUT ALL THEY CAN HOPE FOR IS THAT THEY WILL GET TOGETHER

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ON ONE OR TWO ITEMS ON THE AGENDA FOR ARUSHA III.B SO
THAT THE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD. END
COMMENT.
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